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Abstract
We introduce a new setting for two-party cryptography with temporarily trusted third parties. In
addition to Alice and Bob in this setting, there are additional third parties, which Alice and Bob both
trust to be honest during the protocol. However, once the protocol concludes, there is no guarantee over
the behaviour of these third parties. It is possible that they collaborate and act adversarially. Our goal
is to use these third parties to facilitate protocols which are impossible in two-party cryptography. We
implement a variant of bit commitment in this setting, which we call erasable bit commitment. In this
primitive, Alice has the choice of either opening or erasing her commitment after the commit phase.
The ability to ask for an erasure allows Alice to ask the trusted parties to erase her commitment in
case the trust period is about to expire. This erasure prevents a future coalition of the third parties
and Bob from extracting any information about the commitment. However, this ability also makes
erasable bit commitment weaker than the standard version of bit commitment. In addition to satisfying
the security requirements of bit commitment, our protocol also does not reveal any information about
the commitment to the third parties. Lastly, our protocol for this primitive requires a constant number of
trusted third parties and can tolerate a small number of corrupt trusted parties as well as implementation
errors.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Bit commitment is a cryptographic protocol between two parties, Alice and Bob, who do not trust each
other. The protocol allows Alice to commit to a classical bit in such a way that it is hidden from Bob.
Bit commitment is a useful primitive to implement cryptographic tasks such as coin flipping [1] and input
swapping [2]. It has also been shown to be equivalent to oblivious transfer [3, 4] and secure multi-party
computation [5]. It is well known that unconditional bit commitment between two parties cannot be
implemented classically or even by utilizing quantum resources [6–10]. Several different relaxations on the
security requirements of bit commitment have been studied in the past. In the classical setting, the most
notable of these are settings which require bit commitment to either be statistically binding and computa-
tionally hiding (see, e.g., [11]), or computationally binding and statistically hiding (see, e.g., [12]). On the
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other hand, in the quantum setting unconditionally secure bit commitment can be implemented if one as-
sumes that the adversaries have small or noisy quantum memories (see, e.g., [13–16] and reference therein).
Another possible way of implementing bit commitment is to use a trusted third party, who is honest
during the protocol. (See [17] for a variant where the trusted party only helps to initialize the protocol.)
To commit to a bit b, Alice and Bob first share a secret key k. Then, Alice sends (b ⊕ k) to the third party
(through a private channel), who stores the bit until the open phase. During the open phase, Alice simply
asks the trusted party to reveal the bit (b⊕ k) to Bob, who is able to extract b from it. Since, the third party
is honest, he does not reveal the bit to Bob (Hiding for Bob) and he also does not change the value of the
bit after the commit phase (Binding for Alice). Furthermore, the protocol is hiding even for the third party,
as he cannot determine b unless someone tells him k.
Suppose, however, that Alice decides to abandon the commitment instead of opening it. If it is the
case that Alice can trust the third party forever, Alice’s commitment remains a secret from Bob for all future
times. This is undesirable. It is plausible that at some point in the future the third party becomes an adversary
to Alice and colludes with Bob after the conclusion of the protocol. If Bob and the third party get together,
then they can figure out the value of the bit Alice was committed to.
1.2 Simple protocol for erasable bit commitment from temporary quantum trust
In fact, due to the no-go theorem for classical bit commitment no classical protocol which is binding for
Alice can satisfy a hiding property for both Bob and the trusted party together once the protocol is over.
On the other hand, one can use quantum mechanics to create a protocol, which only requires Alice and
Bob to temporarily trust the third party during the course of the protocol and still to protect the commited
information against the third party breaching the trust after the trust period. The basic idea of this protocol,
implementing a primitive which we term erasable bit commitment (EBC), can be explained by modifying
the aforementioned classical protocol.
First, Alice and Bob share secret bits θ and k. In order to commit to bit b, Alice sends the state
Hθ |b⊕ k〉 (where H is the Hadamard gate) to the third party in order to commit to b. To open the
commitment, Alice asks the third party to forward the state to Bob, who can invert the Hadamard depending
on the value of the secret bit θ, and open b. Furthermore, in case Alice decides to abandon the commitment,
she can ask for an ”erasure”, that is, ask the third party to send her the state back. In this case, once
the protocol is over, even if the trusted party and Bob get together, they will not be able to figure out
Alice’s commitment. The secret bits Bob shared with Alice were not correlated with Alice’s commitment.
Whereas, since the third party honestly returned the quantum state back to Alice, he too would not have
any information about Alice’s commitment. Unlike the classical setting, this primitive is possible in the
quantum setting due to the no-cloning theorem.
Note that if the trust time is limited, the possibility for Alice to ask for an erasure at the end of the trust
period is necessary. In fact, it could happen that the condition for Alice to issue the open command is not
met during the trust period. In such a case, she needs to be able to abort given that the end of the trust period
is looming! The erasure command allows her to abort while still ensuring that her data is not revealed to
Bob or the third party in the future, even if she can no longer trust the third party anymore. Additionally,
the erasure command is announced publicly so that Bob knows that Alice has abandoned her commitment
and may not be committed to a classical value anymore.
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This paper is organised as follows. We begin by introducing the temporarily trusted party setting in the
next section. Then, we describe the erasable bit commitment primitive and the security requirements for
such a primtive. Following this we present a robust protocol for this primitive based on BB84 states and
prove its security informally. In Section 6, we state our claims concerning additional security guarantees. In
Section 7, we show that it is impossible to implement a composable protocol for oblivious transfer in this
setting. The conclusion discusses how our protocol avoids the no-go results for quantum bit commitment
and also compare our protocol to other variants on quantum bit commitment. In the Appendix, we describe
our channel noise model, prove the impossibility of classical protocols for erasable bit commitment in a
trusted party setting and then formally state definitions and provide security proofs.
2 Temporarily trusted party setting
In this section, we describe the temporarily trusted party setting, which we use to implement erasable bit
commitment. As stated earlier, the idea is to try to use trusted third parties to implement protocols which
cannot be implemented in a two party setting. Further, we do not wish to trust the parties for eternity, we
would like to trust them only temporarily for the duration of the protocol. In this section, we formally define
what we mean when we use the term trust. We also wish to allow for a certain number of dishonest or
corrupted trusted parties. We state the trust guarantee in the presence of such parties as well.
2.1 Honest-but-curious parties
We would like our trusted parties to behave in a manner which is indistinguishable from an honest party to
an external observer. We call such behaviour honest-but-curious behaviour. In particular, the input-output
behaviour of honest-but-curious parties is consistent with that of honest participants during the protocol.
However, these parties may try to gather as much information as possible during the protocol. We base
our definition of δ−honest-but-curious parties on the definition of specious adversaries given in [2]. The
definition considered by Ref. [2] is suited for the case of two parties where at most one of those can be
honest-but-curious. We generalize this definition to a setting with p number of parties. The parameter δ is
used to quantify the notion of approximately honest-but-curious behaviour. However, we show below that
it is sufficient to consider δ = 0, or perfectly honest-but-curious behaviour.
Similar to the previous definition, we define a party to be honest-but-curious if at each step of the
protocol it can prove to an external auditor that it has been following the protocol honestly. Specifically, at
any stage during the protocol the honest-but-curious party should be able to apply a local map to its state to
make its behaviour indistinguishable from that of an honest party. The local behaviour part of the definition
below captures this requirement. Further, in the communication behaviour part of the definition, we also
require that the party announce any deviations from the protocol publicly. Note that throughout this paper,
we use the notation ρ ≈ε σ for states ρ and σ to denote 1/2‖ρ− σ‖1 ≤ ε. We also use the notation [n] for
the set {1, 2 · · · , n}.
Definition 1 (δ-honest-but-curious party) Consider a k-step protocol between the parties (Pn)pn=1. Let
ρP1...Pp be an initial state distributed between these parties and ρP ′1...P ′pR an extension of this state to some
reference system R. For every strategy of these parties, there is a corresponding quantum channel which is
applied by these parties to the initial state. We use this channel to denote the strategy of the parties. In the
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following, we say that the parties follow a strategy Φ(j)
P ′1...P ′p
if at step j of the protocol the joint state of all
the parties is Φ(j)
P ′1...P ′p
(ρ). Further, the honest strategy of party Pn is indicated using Pn in the subscript of
Φ and a general (possibly adversarial) strategy by P ′n.
For a k-step protocol between the parties (Pn)
p
n=1, the party Pi is said to be δ−honest-but-curious if
1. Local behaviour: For every strategy of the other parties Pi¯ := (Pn)n6=i, every initial state ρPiPi¯R and
for every step in the protocol j ∈ [k], there exists a local CPTP map Tj such that
((Tj)P ′i ⊗ IP ′¯i ) Φ
(j)
P ′iP
′¯
i
(ρPiPi¯R) ≈δ Φ
(j)
PiP ′¯i
(ρPiPi¯R) (2.1)
where Φ(j)
PiP ′¯i
(Φ(j)
P ′iP
′¯
i
) is the map applied on the initial state after step j if party Pi follows the protocol
honestly (dishonestly) and the other parties follow a general strategy denoted by P ′¯
i
in the channel
subscript.
2. Communication behaviour: The party Pi publicly announces if it receives any input or message
from any party which deviates from the protocol, in particular if party Pi expects to receive an n-
dimensional quantum state and receives something lying outside of that space, it publicly announces
the deviation.
It should be noted at this point that the second requirement above precludes the possibility of the
honest-but-curious nodes communicating and collaborating during a protocol. This is different from the
definition of classical specious adversaries considered by Ref. [2], who allow the specious adversaries to
collaborate freely. In the scenario considered in Ref. [2], this was reasonable since they only considered
specious adversaries. In our setting, however, we consider both honest-but-curious adversaries and dishon-
est adversaries. We cannot expect the participants to know beforehand which parties are honest-but-curious
and which ones are dishonest. Therefore, we further require that the honest-but-curious nodes do not
interact with other parties unless they are required to do so according to the protocol. This assumption,
though, can be lifted in our protocol, as we will show in our additional security claim of ’Expungement on
successful runs’ (Sec. 6.2).
In Appendix C.3.1, we show that if a δ−honest-but-curious party is given a quantum state at some
point during a protocol, and is asked to return it at a later point in the protocol, we can be certain that the
state returned by him was almost the same as the one given to him earlier up to tensoring of a fixed state.
Specifically, suppose that the honest-but-curious party T is given a state ρTR during the protocol, and is
asked to send his share to party P at a later point. Then, the state ρ′RPT ′ (where T
′ is a memory held by T )
sent by T satisfies
ρ′PRT ′ ≈O(√δ) (IR ⊗ IT→P )ρRT ⊗ τT ′ .
for some fixed state τ . (See Lemma 2 for formal statement). We see that in this scenario the honest-but-
curious party is forced to be almost honest in this scenario. In the main body of this paper, we will therefore
assume that the honest-but-curious nodes act completely honestly during the protocol for simplicity, since
we will only be dealing with the action of honest-but-curious parties in scenarios like this. Formally, this
corresponds to assuming δ = 0 or assuming the parties to be perfectly honest-but-curious. This does not
lead to loss of generality and the security arguments remain almost the same. A more careful analysis of the
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behaviour of such parties during our protocol is provided in the Appendix C.3. Lastly, since the memory of
the honest-but-curious parties after giving away the state ρRT is almost decoupled from that state, we say
that the honest-but-curious party forgets the state he received.
2.2 Temporarily trusted party setting
In addition to the usual two parties, Alice and Bob, involved in a bit commitment protocol, there are also
additional trusted third parties T1, . . . , Tm involved in the temporarily trusted party settings we consider.
For the purpose of this paper, we refer to all the additional trusted third parties T1, . . . , Tm as trusted parties
or trusted nodes. Alice and Bob both trust that out of these m trusted parties at least (m − t) will act
honest-but-curiously for the duration of the protocol. In the context of the definition of honest-but-curious
above, in our setting the parties are (A,B, T1, · · · , Tm), and there exists a subset E ⊂ [m] such that |E| ≤ t
and for all j 6∈ E the party Tj is honest-but-curious. Further, the EBC protocol is a two step protocol as will
be seen later. The rest of the third parties (at most t in number) can behave dishonestly during the protocol
and even collaborate with the cheating party. We use the term ’adversaries’ during the protocol to denote
the cheating party (dishonest Alice or dishonest Bob) along with the dishonest trusted nodes.
Further, this trust assumption is temporary or time-limited: after the end of the regular duration of the
protocol, Alice and Bob do not have any guarantee about the behaviour of the third parties. They can
no longer assume that the Ti’s behave honestly. These parties could act adversarially after the end of the
protocol and even collaborate with a dishonest Alice or a dishonest Bob.
3 Erasable bit commitment in a setting with temporarily trusted parties
Erasable bit commitment (EBC) is a protocol between two parties, Alice and Bob, in a setting with m
additional trusted parties, at most t of which are dishonest and adversarial during the protocol. The protocol
has two phases: a commit phase, followed by one of either an open or an erase phase. During the commit
phase, Alice inputs a string s and Bob receives a message notifying him that Alice has completed the
commit phase. At the end of this stage, she is committed to this string, that is, if the commitment is
’opened’ then Bob will receive s or reject the commitment. Moreover, the commitment is hidden from
Alice’s adversaries (Bob and dishonest nodes collaborating with him) at this stage. After the commit phase,
Alice can choose to open or erase the commitment. In case of an open, Bob receives the string s, the string
Alice was committed to. Further, in this case, even if all the trusted parties get together after the protocol
they cannot determine s. In case Alice chooses to erase, then once the protocol is over, even if Bob and all
the trusted parties collaborate they cannot ascertain the value of s.
In the rest of the paper, we consider a randomized version of erasable bit commitment. Randomized
EBC is essentially the same as above except now Alice does not have any input during the commit stage.
Instead of choosing the string for her commitment as above, Alice receives a random string c at the end
of the commit phase, which is called as her commitment. Our security definitions and proofs are for this
randomized version, and we leave direct discussion of non-randomized version for future work. See, e.g.,
Ref. [16] for a discussion on how to transform a randomized BC into a non-randomized one in their setting
by asking Alice to send s⊕ c to Bob after the commit phase.
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Thus, in the randomized EBC protocol (referred to as EBC here on) Alice and Bob do not have any
inputs during the commit phase. Alice inputs an ”open” or ”erase” bit at some point after the commit phase
into the protocol. In addition to the commitment c mentioned above, Alice and Bob also receive flags FA
and FB (let F = FA = FB) notifying them if Alice called for an erase (F = erase), or if the open was
successful (F = success) or if the open failed (F = failure). In general if Alice is dishonest, Bob may not
receive the same string as Alice. So, we call Bob’s output cˆ. To summarize, the outputs of the protocol for
Alice and Bob are as follows:
• Alice outputs a string c ∈ {0, 1}` at the end of the commit phase, and a flag FA ∈
{success, failure, erase} at the end of either the open or erase phase;
• Bob outputs a string cˆ ∈ {0, 1}` as well as a flag FB ∈ {success, failure, erase} at the end of either
the open or erase phase.
3.1 Security requirements for erasable bit commitment:
Given m trusted nodes (Ti)mi=1 of which at least (m − t) act honest-but-curiously for the duration of the
protocol, an erasable bit commitment protocol satisfies the following security requirements:
1. Correctness: If both Alice and Bob are honest and Alice receives c during the commit phase, then, in
the case of open, Bob accepts the commitment (F = success) and cˆ = c.
2. Binding: If Bob is honest, then, after the commit phase, there exists a classical variable C˜ such that
Alice is commited to C˜, i.e. during the open phase, either Bob accepts the commitment (FB =
success) and receives an output Cˆ such that Cˆ = C˜, or Bob rejects the commitment (FB = failure).
(This guarantee only makes sense in the case that the open protocol is run after the commit protocol;
if an erase protocol is run instead, then Alice does not have to be committed to a classical value
anymore.)
3. Hiding:
(a) Commit: If Alice is honest and she receives the output c during the commit phase, then, after the
commit phase and before the open or erase phase, Bob and the dishonest trusted nodes together
can only extract negligible information about c, i.e., their joint state is almost decoupled from
Alice’s commitment.
(b) Open: If Alice and Bob are honest and Alice’s commitment is c, then, after an open phase,
the Ti’s together can only extract negligible information about c, i.e., their joint state is almost
decoupled from Alice’s commitment.
(c) Erase: If Alice is honest and she receives the output c during the commit phase, then, after the
erase phase, Bob and the Ti’s together can only extract negligible information about c, i.e., their
joint state is almost decoupled from Alice’s commitment.
We give more formal security definitions based on the security definitions for bit commitment given in
Ref. [16] in Appendix C. One can easily check that the simple protocol given in Section 1.2 satisfies these
requirements (if we consider m = 1, t = 0 and δ = 0).
Lastly, it should be noted that the binding condition for EBC is weaker than the corresponding binding
condition for bit commitment. In EBC, Alice is only committed to a classical value if the commitment is
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opened. This makes EBC a weaker primitive than bit commitment. For example, we cannot use an EBC
protocol instead of bit commitment to implement oblivious transfer (OT) using the protocol given in Ref. [3].
If we attempt to do so in a straightforward fashion, then the OT protocol, hence created, could possibly be
susceptible to a superposition attack by Bob. However, we should note that even though EBC is weaker than
bit commitment, it cannot be implemented quantum mecahnically in the two-party setting without additional
assumptions. The no-go theorem for two-party quantum bit commitment [6,7] precludes the possibility of a
protocol which is both hiding and binding after the commit phase, as EBC is.
4 Robust Protocol for EBC based on BB84 states
In this section, we will develop a protocol for EBC using BB84 states which is robust to noise and a small
non-zero number of dishonest trusted nodes. This will be done by modifying the simple protocol presented
in Section 1.2. We use tools like privacy amplification and classical error correcting codes for this purpose.
Before we proceed further, however, we describe our channel assumptions and our noise model.
4.1 Channel assumptions
We assume that the communication between the participants is done over secure (private and authenticated)
channels between each pair of participants. We assume that the classical channels are noiseless, but
we allow the quantum channels to be noisy. The fact that the quantum channels are noisy somewhat
complicates the authentication part of the security guarantee: we cannot simply guarantee that the state
output by the channel will be the state which was input. For simplicity, we assume the following, weaker,
authentication guarantee with a simple model of adversarial noise: if the quantum channel in one direction
between a pair of participants is used n times at some timestep, then at least (1− γ)n of these transmissions
will be transmitted perfectly, while the other at most γn transmissions might be arbitrarily corrupted by the
adversary. Note that this is sufficient to model some random noise, for example, depolarizing noise, except
with negligible probability.
Also note that we could use a shared secret key between sender and receiver together with variants
of various quantum cryptography techniques, e.g., that of the trap authentication scheme [18], to obtain
guarantees that with high probability, the actual channel acts as a superposition over such type of bounded
noise channels (in the sense of the adversarial channels of [19]). We leave a detailed analysis of how to
implement such a variant of our guarantee in practical settings and the proof of security of our scheme in
such settings for future work. Also note that we do not assume any minimal noise level on the channels;
guarantees on minimal noise level can be sufficient to allow one to implement cryptographic primitives like
bit commitment (see, e.g., Ref. [20]).
We assume that time-stamping is performed, for example, by broadcasting end-of-time-step signals
(with potential abort if some participant is dishonest). As a result, we do not require any synchronicity
assumptions.
4.2 High-level description
We consider a setting with m trusted third parties, at most t of which can be dishonest. To understand the
tools and the structure of the robust protocol, we try to extend the simple protocol presented in Section
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1.2 in a straightforward fashion. Imagine that Alice wishes to commit to the string x ∈ {0, 1}k (this can
be selected randomly to perform randomized EBC). To commit to x, during the commit phase, Alice
randomly selects a basis θ ∈R {0, 1}k and a key v ∈ {0, 1}k, and distributes the state |ψ〉 = Hθ |x⊕ v〉
to the m-trusted parties, giving k/m qubits to each party. Further, she sends θ and v to Bob. In case Alice
chooses to open, the trusted parties simply forward their shares to Bob and in case she chooses to erase,
they send their states back to Alice. If everyone is honest during the protocol and there is no noise, then
the string decoded by Bob, xˆ, is the same as x. However, if some qubits sent to Bob are corrupted by
the dishonest trusted nodes or noise then xˆ 6= x. In order to circumvent this problem, we have Alice first
encode her string x as y = Enc(x) using a pre-agreed [n, k, d]-classical error correcting code (ECC) with
appropriate parameters and then sends it to the trusted parties. Not only would this allow the protocol to
be robust to noise, it will also help ensure that the protocol is binding for Alice by making sure that Alice
and the adversarial nodes cannot change their data so much as to change the value of the committed string
x. Further, if in such a protocol t third parties collaborate with Bob, then they would know y for tmn
positions. This would provide Bob with some partial information about Alice’s commitment x. Therefore,
we require Alice to use privacy amplification (PA) to extract a shorter commitment c = Ext(x, r), which
would be almost decoupled from her adversaries’ share using a randomness extractor Ext. Here r ∈R R is
picked by Alice before the commit phase and sent to Bob during the commit phase. In the next section, we
will show how we can choose the right parameters to ensure that the other security requirements are also met.
We describe the structure of our protocol before we discuss our parameter choices. Fix an error
correcting code with encoding map Enc and minimum distance d, and the randomness extractor Ext. Our
protocol has the following structure:
Commit: Alice randomly selects a x ∈R {0, 1}k, z ∈R {0, 1}n, θ ∈R {0, 1}n and r ∈R R. She outputs
the random commitment c = Ext(x, r). Let y := Enc(x) and u := y ⊕ z. She then distributes the qubits
of |ψ〉 := Hθ |u〉 equally between the trusted nodes and privately sends the classical information (θ, z, r) to
Bob.
Open: Alice publicly announces ’open’ and sends x to Bob privately. The trusted parties forward their
shares of |ψ〉 to Bob. Bob measures |ψ〉 in θ basis and checks if the outcome agrees with x. If the measured
outcome passes the tests, then Bob computes and outputs c := Ext(x, r).
Erase: Alice publicly announces ’erase’. During the erase phase, the trusted nodes send their shares of
|ψ〉 back to Alice.
4.3 Choice of parameters
Consider the protocol given in the structure above. Let’s start by looking at the case when both Alice and
Bob are honest, and t of the trusted nodes act adversarially. We also account for at most γn of the transmis-
sions being corrupted by the adversaries according to the channel model. Suppose ψ˜ is the state forwarded
to Bob by the trusted parties. Let uˆ be the string measured by Bob when he measures ψ˜ in the θ basis and
let yˆ := uˆ ⊕ z. Since there are at most t dishonest trusted nodes, we have that h(y, yˆ) ≤ (t/m + γ)n. So,
if Alice encodes k randomly chosen bits x into y = Enc(x) using a [n, k, d] ECC with minimum distance
d satisfying d > 2(t/m + γ)n, then y is the only codeword satisfying h(y, yˆ) ≤ (t/m + γ)n and Bob can
agree with Alice’s x despite t of the trusted nodes being active adversaries.
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(a) Commit phase (b) Open phase
(c) Erase phase
Figure 1: The structure of the protocol is depicted here. During the commit phase, Alice sends |ψ〉 to the
trusted parties and (z, r, θ) to Bob. In case Alice chooses to open, the quantum state is forwarded to Bob.
Whereas, in case of an erase, it is returned back to Alice.
Next, we consider the case when Alice collaborates with these t adversary Ti’s. In this scenario, is the
protocol binding or could Alice hope to change her commitment during the open phase after the commit
phase? Suppose that the minimum distance of the ECC is d = 2tn/m + 1. Then, it is possible that Alice
could pick y˜ such that there exist x1 and x2 and corresponding codewords y1 = Enc(x1) and y2 = Enc(x2)
satisfying h(y˜, y1) = tn/m and h(y˜, y2) = tn/m + 1. Alice could then collaborate with the t adversarial
trusted nodes to make Bob decode either x1 or x2 at the open phase. In order to avoid this, we require an
ECC with a minimum distance d > 4(t/m+ γ)n, and only have Bob accept the commitment if yˆ is within
a distance (t/m + γ)n of an actual codeword. Otherwise, Bob outputs ”failure” because he is convinced
that Alice did not provide a valid commitment. In this way, we can ensure that Alice cannot change the
value of the commitment that she opens after the commit phase.
Finally, we look at the hiding properties of the protocol. First, observe that after the commit phase Bob
and the adversarial trusted nodes have access to at most (t/m + γ)n information about y. Irrespective
of the ECC used this reveals at most (t/m + γ)n bits of information about x. Hence, we want to ensure
that privacy amplification is applied such that (t/m + γ)n bits of information about x reveal almost no
information about Alice’s commitment which is c = Ext(x, r). For this purpose, we would like the
parameter k of the ECC to be large enough compared to (t/m + γ)n, so that the output length ` of the
randomness extractor used during privacy amplification is Θ(n) and we can get exponential security in n.
Therefore, we choose k = Θ(n), and ` = Θ(n) such that k − (t/m+ γ)n− ` = Ω(n). (Here Ω(n) refers
to functions asymptotically lower bounded by n up to constant factors and Θ(n) to functions both lower
and upper bounded by n up to constant factors.)
In this way, the information held by the adversary is essentially decoupled from Alice’s commitment
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c after the commit phase, as well as after the protocol in both the case of an open and an erase. After
the protocol, the (m − t) honest-but-curious trusted nodes completely forget the quantum states they held
and hence any information about x either by sending their shares back to Alice (erase) or by sending it to
Bob (open). As a result, they have no information about c either at the end of the protocol. Furthermore,
the information held by the adversaries in both the case of an open and an erase is lesser than (t/m + γ)n.
Thus, even if all the trusted parties and adversaries get together they would be almost decoupled from Alice’s
commitment.
4.4 Protocol
Given a security parameter n, Alice and Bob agree on an [n, k, d] ECC with encoding map
Enc : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n, as well as a randomness extractor Ext : {0, 1}k × R → {0, 1}` for
some ` which we will now define.
Let γ be the tolerable noise level. We consider a setting with m temporarily trusted nodes at most t of
which act dishonestly during the protocol. As discussed above, we fix the various parameters for ECC and
PA as follows. For some parameters δc > 0 and δ′ > 0:
• k = ( tm + γ + δc + δ′)n
• ` = δcn
• d = 4( tm + γ) n + 1
Existence of ECC and PA schemes with these parameters: It should be noted that (t/m + γ) should be
small to allow for the existence of ECC with the above parameters. For example, we can use the Gilbert
Varshamov bound [21] to prove that such codes exist for parameters (t,m, γ) for which
t
m
+ γ < 1−H2
(
4
(
t
m
+ γ
))
for large enough n (here H2(·) is the binary entropy function). This is inequality is satisfied as long as
t/m + γ ≤ 0.083. The existence of PA schemes follows from the privacy amplification theorem (see, e.g.,
Ref. [22] for an early version robust to quantum side information).
The three phases of the protocol are as follows.
Commit phase
1. Alice randomly picks x ∈R {0, 1}k, z ∈R {0, 1}n, r ∈R R, θ ∈R {0, 1}n.
2. Alice computes c = Ext(x, r), y = Enc(x), u = y ⊕ z.
3. Alice sends z, r, θ to Bob, who acknowledges reception through broadcast.
4. Alice prepares |ψ〉 = Hθ |u〉.
5. Alice distributes the qubits of |ψ〉 evenly between T1 . . . Tm (sends n/m qubits to each trusted party).
6. T1 . . . Tm verify that ψ is in span {|0〉 , |1〉}n, and all acknowledge reception through broadcast.
7. Alice outputs c ∈ {0, 1}`.
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Open phase
1. On input ”open”, Alice broadcasts ”open” and sends x to Bob.
2. T1 . . . Tm send ψ to Bob.
3. Bob measures Hθ(ψ) in computational basis, gets outcome uˆ.
4. Bob decodes yˆ = uˆ⊕ z.
5. Bob computes y′ = Enc(x) and h = h(yˆ, y′).
6. If h > ( tm+γ)n, Bob outputs cˆ = 0
` and FB = failure, else output cˆ = Ext(x, r) and FB = success.
Bob broadcasts FB and Alice outputs FA = FB .
Erase phase
1. On input ”erase”, Alice broadcasts ”erase”.
2. T1 . . . Tm send ψ back to Alice.
3. Alice measures Hθ(ψ) in computational basis, gets outcome uˆ.
4. Alice computes yˆ = uˆ⊕ z and h = h(yˆ, y).
5. If h > ( tm + γ)n, Alice outputs FA = failure, else she output FA = erase.
6. Alice broadcasts FB and Bob outputs FB = FA and cˆ = 0`.
5 Security of the protocol
We now informally prove that our protocol satisfies the security requirements given in Section 3.1. Through-
out we assume that we are in a setting with m temporarily trusted third parties Ti’s out of which at most t
can be dishonest during the protocol, and that γ is the acceptable rate of noise for the quantum channels.
After the completion of the protocol, the trusted parties may bring the information they gathered during the
protocol together and collaborate with the adversaries. Once again, we point the reader to Appendix C.3 for
formal security definitions and their proofs.
5.1 Correctness: Dishonest trusted nodes cannot change the commitment
Claim 1 For honest Alice and honest Bob, the protocol is correct: If Alice outputs c during the commit
phase, then Bob outputs cˆ = c and FB = success during the open phase..
Suppose Alice follows the protocol honestly and prepares (x, r, z, θ) and |ψ〉 as required by the protocol.
Then, her output is c = Ext(x, r). Since, at least (m− t) of the trusted nodes are honest-but-curious during
the protocol, the yˆ measured by Bob satisfies h(y, yˆ) ≤ (t/m + γ)n as the adversarial trusted nodes only
have access to at most (t/m+ γ)n qubits. Thus, Bob accepts Alice’s x and outputs cˆ which is equal to c.
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5.2 Binding for Alice after the commit phase
Claim 2 For an honest Bob, the protocol is binding for Alice after the execution of the commit phase: After
the commit phase, there exists a classical variable C˜ such that Alice is commited to C˜, i.e. during the open
phase, with high probability, either Bob accepts the commitment (FB = success) and receives an output Cˆ
such that Cˆ = C˜, or Bob rejects the commitment (FB = failure). (As before this guarantee only makes
sense in the case that the open protocol is run after the commit protocol.)
Suppose Alice sends some ρ˜ to the trusted nodes and (θ, r, z) to Bob. Once they are handed over to
the trusted nodes, all the qubits of ρ˜, except for at most (t/m + γ)n qubits which are controlled by the
dishonest Ti’s and adversarial noise, remain unchanged. Therefore, if we can show that Alice can’t change
her commitment by modifying any set of (t/m + γ)n qubits we will be done. This is achieved by using a
classical ECC with distance d > 4(t/m+ γ)n and having Bob reject the received message yˆ when there is
no codeword in a (t/m+ γ)n ball around yˆ.
The fact that Alice is committed to a classical variable C˜ after the commit phase if the commitment
were to be opened can be seen by using a simulator based argument. Fundamentally, if the open phase
were to be conducted right after the commit phase then Bob would measure a random variable Y˜ when he
measures ρ˜ in the θ basis and xors the output with z. He could then use Y˜ to figure out Alice’s commitment
C˜. It will be shown that once Alice commits to a particular instance of this random variable, she cannot
change it during the open phase. A formal simulator based argument for this is given in Appendix C.3.4.
After the commit phase, we define Y˜ as above. Let us consider a particular instance of this random
variable y˜. Let y¯ be a codeword at a distance less than or equal to 2(t/m + γ)n away from y˜. Note that
there exists at most one such y¯ since the minimum distance d satisfies d = 4(t/m + γ)n + 1. If there is
no such y¯, then even after modifying (t/m + γ)n positions of y˜ the distance from any codeword is still
greater than (t/m + γ)n and Bob rejects any x Alice tries to open, so let us focus on the case where there
exists a unique such y¯. We will show that in this instance Bob either accepts the commitment corresponding
to y¯ or the protocol ends in failure. Let yˆ be as defined in the protocol. Alice’s actions can either bring yˆ
closer to y¯ or take it away from it. If her actions manage to get yˆ within a distance of (t/m + γ)n from y¯,
then the commitment corresponding to y¯ would be accepted by Bob. On the other hand, no matter how she
modifies her string, she cannot come within a distance of (t/m+ γ)n of some other codeword y′, since the
distance between y′ and y˜ would be greater than 2(t/m+γ)n and she only has access to (t/m+γ)n qubits.
Since for every instance of Y˜ Alice cannot change her commitment after the commit phase, the protocol is
binding.
5.3 Hiding for the adversaries after the commit phase
Claim 3 The protocol is hiding for honest Alice after commit: If Alice is honest and she receives the output
c during the commit phase, then, after the commit phase and before the open or erase phase, Bob and the
dishonest trusted nodes together can only extract negligible information about c, i.e., their joint state is
almost decoupled from Alice’s commitment.
Let E be the set of dishonest trusted parties and E¯ the set of honest-but-curious nodes. Together the
adversaries have access to at most (t/m+γ)n qubits of |ψ〉, z and θ. Let’s say the adversaries’ qubits are in
the quantum memory TE . Further, suppose that these qubits encode the string yE (the string y corresponding
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to the positions of the qubits held by E). Then, we have
Hmin(X|TE , Z,Θ) = Hmin(Y |TE , Z,Θ)
≥ Hmin(Y |YE , Z,Θ)
= Hmin(Y |YE)
≥ Hmin(Y )− |YE |
= Hmin(X)− |YE |
≥ k − ( t
m
+ γ)
= (δc + δ
′)n.
The first equality follows since Y = Enc(X) and Enc is a deterministic one-to-one function, the inequality
on the second line is a result of applying the data processing inequality, the equality in the third line follows
from the fact that Z,Θ are independent of Y and the inequality in the fourth line follows from the chain
rule for min-entropy (|YE | is the length of the string YE).
Since ` = δcn, Hmin(X|TE , Z,Θ)− ` ≥ δ′n and by PA theorem, it holds that for any set of adversaries
with access limited to these many qubits, the quantum memory TE is almost independant of the output c of
Alice’s randomized commitment, even if one is given z and θ. Hence, the claim holds true.
5.4 Hiding for all trusted parties and Bob together after the erase phase
Claim 4 The protocol is hiding for honest Alice after the erase phase: If Alice is honest and she receives
the output c during the commit phase, then, after the erase phase, Bob and the Ti’s together can only extract
negligible information about c, i.e., their joint state is almost decoupled from Alice’s commitment.
At the end of the erase phase, once again all the parties together have at most (t/m+ γ)n qubits of |ψ〉.
The rest of the qubits are completely forgotten by the (m − t) quantum honest-but-curious nodes, and the
content of their register TE¯ is independent of x. Further, Bob does not get any additional information during
the erase phase. Therefore, similar to above, we get
Hmin(X|TE , TE¯ , Z,Θ) ≥ (δc + δ′)n
and the hiding property holds for the Ti’s and Bob after the erase phase.
5.5 Hiding for all the trusted parties together after the open phase
Claim 5 The protocol is hiding for honest Alice and honest Bob after an open phase: If Alice and Bob are
honest and Alice’s commitment is c, then, after an open phase, the Ti’s together can only extract negligible
information about c, i.e., their joint state is almost decoupled from Alice’s commitment.
The information held by all the trusted nodes in this case is lesser than their information in the case of
an erase. The claim follows easily by following the argument in Section 5.4.
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6 Additional security properties
6.1 Decoupling of honest-but-curious nodes during the protocol
Our protocol satisfies a stronger hiding property than one given in Section 3.1. In addition to being hiding
for Bob and the dishonest trusted nodes during the commit stage, the protocol is also hiding for the honest-
but-curious trusted nodes in the sense that the qubits they hold locally are also approximately decoupled
from Alice’s commitment. A similar strong security definition was used by Ref. [2] for their protocols on
secure evaluation of unitaries against honest-but-curious adversaries. In particular, their security definition
demands that at any point in the protocol the state held by the honest-but-curious party can be simulated
by him by performing local operations on his share of the initial or final state. This definition ensures
that the honest-but-curious party never has access to more information than it needs to. It is based on a
definition given in Ref. [23] for statistical zero knowledge proofs. However, this requirement is too strong
for cryptographic protocol with temporarily trusted parties, since in the quantum domain one can force the
honest-but-curious parties to ’forget’ quantum information. So, it is possible that at some point in a protocol
a honest-but-curious party holds too much information in its quantum state, but the protocol is such that at a
later point the party is forced to return the information and hence ’forgets’ it. This is the behaviour that we
try to encapsulate in our security definition of erasable bit commitment in a setting with temporarily trusted
parties. We only insist that at the end of the protocol, the state held by the honest-but-curious nodes are
completely decoupled from the commitment. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the protocol presented in
this paper satisfies the following stronger security requirement used by Ref. [2].
Claim 6 For an honest Alice, the protocol is locally hiding for all the honest-but-curious nodes: the local
quantum state of the honest-but-curious nodes is almost decoupled from Alice’s output c throughout the
protocol.
This can be proven using the same argument as that of hiding for adveraries (Sec. 5.3). After the commit
phase, an honest-but-curious node Ti for i ∈ E¯ has access to only n/m qubits in his quantum memory TE¯i .
Therefore, we once again have the following min-entropy guarantee
Hmin(X|TE¯i) ≥ Hmin(X)− log(|TE¯i |)
≥ (δc + δ′)n.
6.2 Expungement on successful runs
In this section, we show that our protocol has an additional property whenever it is successful, namely that
it guarantees that the commitment is indeed ’expunged’ from the memories of the trusted nodes, or that the
trusted nodes indeed ’forget’ about the commitment. In order to prove this, we only need to assume that
the trusted nodes did not collaborate with Bob. We do not even need to assume that the trusted nodes acted
honestly. The assumption that Bob does not collaborate with the trusted nodes is necessary, since he knows
the choice of basis θ, and given the basis, the trusted parties could measure |ψ〉 without disturbing it. In
a sense, all we need to implement our protocol are three sets of parties which do not communicate with
each other unless required by the protocol; this is similar to the type of assumptions used in relativistic bit
commitment and we further explore the link between our setting and that of relativistic bit commitment in
the conclusion. Hence, it seems that the trust assumption required by our protocol is fairly weak. Further,
this security claim also allows us to move closer to the definition of honest-but-curious parties in multi-party
protocols given in Ref. [2], which permits such parties to communicate and collaborate with each other.
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6.2.1 Expungement after the erase phase
Claim 7 For an honest Alice and FA = erase, if Bob does not collaborate with the trusted parties during
the execution of the protocol, then the protocol is hiding for all the trusted parties and Bob together after the
execution of an erase phase, even if the trusted parties collaborate and act arbitrarily during the protocol.
The setup for this is similar to one for QKD, with Alice after the erase phase acting as ”QKD-Bob”.
Since, we assume that Bob does not collaborate with the trusted parties, they must handle |ψ〉 = Hθ |u〉
and return it to Alice without knowing anything about θ or u. Upon receiving ψ back, Alice measures it
according to θ and only accepts if the measured error rate is at most γ. This is indeed similar to a QKD
setup, and standard methods [4,24,25] allow us to show that, even if θ is revealed, in the case of an accepted
run,
Hεmin(U |TΘ) ≥ n(1−H2(γ + µε))− δε, (6.1)
for parameters µε, δε, and T the memory held by the trusted parties after the erase phase. This is not quite
sufficient for our purposes, since we want to make sure that the min-entropy about x is high even if, after
the protocol, B and the Ti’s get together, i.e., we want to prove that Hε′min(X|TΘZ) is large. Using among
other tools chain rules for smooth min-entropy [26], we show precisely this in the Appendix F.2.
Note that we could even allow for Bob and a small set TE of the trusted nodes such that E ⊂ [m] and
|E| ≤ t to collaborate with Bob, as long as the remaining (m− t) trusted nodes do not interact with TE and
Bob.
6.2.2 Expungement after the open phase
Claim 8 For honest Alice and honest Bob, and FA = FB = success after the execution of an open, the
protocol is hiding for all the trusted nodes even if they collaborate and act arbitrarily during the protocol.
The argument follows similarly as for the previous claim, now with Bob acting as ”QKD-Bob”, except
that the adversary has even less information since we assume Alice and Bob are both honest.
7 Impossibility of oblivious transfer and strong bit commitment in the tem-
porarily trusted party setting
A natural question is whether we can implement a stronger version of bit commitment in the trusted party
setting, where Alice and Bob only need to trust the third parties during the commit phase, and after the
commit phase Alice is committed to a classical value in addition to the security requirements presented
in Section 3.1. We will refer to such a protocol as strong bit commitment. If a composable protocol
for oblivious transfer in the trusted party setting exists1, then we could use it to implement strong bit
commitment using the standard construction of BC from OT [5].
We can follow the Mayers and Lo-Chau impossibility proofs for two-party bit commitment [6,7] to show
that it is impossible to implement strong bit commitment in this setting. Suppose to the contrary that such a
1An oblivious transfer protocol has two inputs x0, x1 for Alice, and one input for Bob c ∈ {0, 1}. At the end of the protocol,
Bob receives the output xc. In the temporarily trusted setting, an OT protocol should be such that Alice and the third parties together
can only extract negligible information about Bob’s input c, and similarly Bob and the third parties together should not be able to
extract more than negligible information about x1−c.
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protocol exists. Observe that the trusted parties can purify their actions simply by keeping their auxiallary
qubits instead of discarding them. This is valid honest-but-curious behaviour, since an external auditor will
not be able to distinguish between the modified protocol and the original protocol. Thus, the new protocol
should also have the same security properties as the original protocol. Then, following the original two-party
impossibility proofs, Alice and Bob can also purify their actions and the communication. Suppose, Alice
commits to the bit b = 0 in the modified protocol. At the end of the commit phase, the joint state of the
parties is |ψ(0)ABT 〉. Since, the protocol is hiding for both Bob and the third parties together after the commit
phase (the third parties are only trusted till the end of the commit phase), we would have ψ(0)BT ≈ ψ(1)BT .
This would imply the existence of a unitary UA on Alice’s share, which would allow her to switch between
her commitments, i.e., (UA ⊗ IBT ) |ψ(0)ABT 〉 ≈ |ψ(1)ABT 〉. Further, as we stated above this no-go result for
strong-BC also rules out the existence of a composable oblivious transfer protocol in this setting.
8 Conclusion
8.1 Avoiding quantum no-go results
In this work, we introduced a new primitive, erasable bit commitment, as well as a new paradigm, that of
temporary quantum trust. The temporary trust assumption allows us to avoid no-go results for quantum bit
commitment: if Bob and the trusted nodes were to put their information together right after the commit
phase, they would be able to extract the value of Alice’s commitment. Hence, the protocol is not hiding
against a coalition of Bob and all the trusted nodes. In fact, no protocol which is hiding for both Bob and
the trusted nodes can be binding for Alice according to the no-go theorem for quantum bit commitment. As
already noted, our robust protocol, which makes use of a constant number of trusted nodes, is even robust
against a coalition of Bob and a small constant fraction of trusted nodes, as long as the other trusted nodes
are indeed acting honest-but-curiously and do not communicate with Bob during the execution period. Note
that for security against a dishonest Alice, we cannot guarantee that she is still committed to a classical
value at the end of an erase phase. Hence, this primitive is weaker than a standard two-party bit commitment
whenever an erase rather than an open might be required.
8.2 Comparison to other work
8.2.1 Bit commitment in bounded and noisy quantum storage model:
In the bounded and noisy quantum storage model [15, 16, 27], security of bit commitment is ensured by
assuming that the parties do not have access to perfect quantum memory. This assumption allows for the
implementation of the stronger, regular version of bit commitment. In our protocol, for the duration of the
trust period, the trusted node must maintain Alice’s commitment in memory, but they do not need to further
manipulate it. In some sense, the requirements here are complementary to those in the noisy storage model.
In the noisy storage model, an honest Alice waits for a long enough period for the content of a dishonest
Bob’s quantum memory to decay sufficiently before announcing her basis. Here, the temporary trust period
must be sufficiently short to prevent the contents of the trusted nodes’ quantum memories from decaying
too much before they are transmitted to Bob. Hence, as progress in physical implementations allows for
better and better quantum memory and the power of the noisy storage model decreases, our model allows
for longer trust period if so desired. We believe that efforts towards the physical implementation of this
protocol could be an interesting stepping stone towards more complicated multi-node protocols.
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8.2.2 Relativistic bit commitment:
In relativistic quantum bit commitment [28–31], Alice and Bob are split into various nodes at different
locations, and the security of the scheme follows from the impossibility of communication between these
nodes which is enforced from relativistic constraints. Hence, Alice has to have complete trust into all of the
nodes which are corresponding to her, and similarly for Bob. Contrary to our temporary trust setting, there is
no need for nodes which are trusted by both parties. However, the mutual trust between all nodes associated
to Alice is usually assumed to be everlasting rather than time-limited as in our setting, and similarly for Bob.
Similar to our protocol, relativistic bit commitment is also weaker than bit commitment in the case where
the commitment is not opened.
It would be interesting to see if our protocol can be modified to fit the relativistic framework, by split-
ting the temporarily trusted nodes into nodes which are temporarily trusted by Alice and nodes which are
temporarily trusted by Bob, while keeping only a single main Alice node and a single main Bob node.
8.2.3 Cheat-sensitive bit commitment:
In cheat-sensitive bit commitment [32–34], a dishonest party might be able to cheat with non-trivial proba-
bility, but then it can also be caught cheating by the honest party with a bounded probability. In contrast to
that, our protocol bounds the probability that a dishonest party trying to cheat is caught and shows that this
probability is high. It might be possible to create stronger versions of cheat-sensitive bit commitment in our
trusted party setting.
8.2.4 Proving erasure:
In Ref. [35], the authors investigate whether a server hosting data can information-theoretically prove the
deletion of the data. The notion of deletion they use is similar in spirit to our notion of erasure. However,
in the setting considered by them, only the case where the client keeps a key much shorter than the message
to be hosted and later erased by the server is interesting. Whereas, in our work we are perfectly fine with
using a long key. In fact in our main protocol Bob receives a key as long as the message itself. While the
temporarily trusted third parties receive and later erase the encrypted message. The work in Ref. [35] was
done independently and concurrently with ours.
8.3 Outlook
There are many research directions that are sparked off from this work. A first is to develop EBC protocols
which are tailored for optical implementations. Another is to practically implement a variant of our authen-
tication guarantee for noisy quantum channels from simpler primitives, say shared secret keys, and prove
the corresponding security of our scheme in such a model. It will also be interesting to further study the ap-
plications of the erasable bit commitment primitive, and variants. More generally, it will also be interesting
to further study the temporary quantum trust setting and what else can be achieved in that setting. Another
interesting direction of future research would be to relate this temporary trusted setting with the relativistic
setting. In particular, as mentioned above, is there a way to implement an erasable bit commitment, with
the help of relativistic constraint, such that some subset of the trusted nodes is only trusted by Alice and the
other are only trusted by Bob.
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Appendix
A Channel Model
As stated in the main body, we study quantum channels with the following authentication guarantee: if the
quantum channel in one direction between a pair of participants is used n times in a given timestep, then at
least (1 − ε)n of these transmission will be transmitted perfectly, while the other at most εn transmission
might be arbitrarily corrupted by the adversary.
We now argue that this is sufficient to model some random noise, e.g., depolarizing noise, except with
negligeable probability.
As a model for random channel noise, we use a depolarizing qubit channel, which takes as input a qubit
ρ and outputs (1− ε)ρ + ε I2 for some parameter ε. Note that for any ρ, I2 = 14(ρ+XρX + Y ρY + ZρZ).
This is a very general noise model, in particular it is a stronger form of noise than erasure noise, since we
can always further decay an erasure channel into a depolarizing channel by outputting I2 whenever there is
an erasure flag. Moreover, if we apply n idenpendent depolarizing channels to n qubits, then, except with
probability negligeable in n, the output of these channel is a combination of at least (1− 3ε4 + δ)n perfectly
transmitted qubits plus Pauli errors on the remaining qubits, for some small constant δ. We can then denote
γ = 1− 3ε4 + δ the fraction of perfectly transmitted qubits, except with negligeable probability in n.
B No-go for classical EBC protocols
In this section, we will show that EBC cannot be implemented classically. The proof of this fact is similar to
the proof that unconditionally secure bit commitment cannot be implemented classically. In particular, we
show that if the protocol is statistically hiding for Bob and the trusted parties after an erase phase, then the
protocol was not binding for Alice in the first place.
We assume that all the trusted nodes are honest but curious and that there is no dishonest adversarial
node (this is sufficient to prove the result). Moreover, we assume that each party keeps a copy of their
message transcripts, since they are allowed to be honest-but-curious. Let b ∈ {0, 1} be Alice’s input. The
transcripts after each phase of the protocol for honest Alice and Bob are given by:
Commit:Mcb := (ABcb , AT cb , BT cb , TT cb )
Open:McbMob := (ABcbABob , AT cbAT ob , BT cbBT ob , TT cb TT ob )
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Erase:McbMeb := (ABcbABeb , AT cbAT eb , BT cbBT eb , TT cb TT eb ).
where the random variable XY phb represents the transcript of communication between party X and party
Y during the phase ph of the protocol given that Alice’s commitment is b. The transcript of communication
between all the trusted parties and Alice is written as AT for the sake of simplicity. Similarly, BT rep-
resents the transcripts between Bob and all of the trusted nodes and TT the transcripts between all of the
trusted nodes. Further, let PB be the random variable of private information and randomness used by Bob
and PT be the random variable of private information and randomness used by all the trusted parties. As
we aim to show that Alice can cheat, we assume that Bob follows the honest strategy throughout the protocol.
If Bob and the trusted parties get together after an erasure, then all the transcripts would be available to
them. The requirement that the protocol be hiding for Bob and the trusted parties after an erasure implies
that
Mc0Me0PBPT ≈εMc1Me1PBPT
⇒Mc0PBPT ≈εMc1PBPT
using the monotonicity under partial trace. We will now show that a dishonest Alice can use this to cheat.
First, she runs the commit phase for b = 0. Now, if she wishes to open a 0, she simply runs the open phase
honestly. On the other hand, if she wishes to open a 1, then all she has to do is to run the open phase for 1.
In this case, we have
Mc0PBPT ≈εMc1PBPT
⇒Mc0M¯o1PBPT ≈εMc1Mo1PBPT
where M¯o1 denotes the transcripts produced during the open phase by a dishonest Alice following our pro-
cedure. The approximate equality in the second step follows once again from the monotonicity of the trace
distance. The right hand side in the second equation above opens b = 1 due to correctness with high prob-
ability (> 1− ε). Thus, except with probability 2ε, Alice is able to open a 1 even though she committed to
0.
C Proof of Security for the Erasable Bit Commitment protocol
C.1 High-level description
Our definitions are direct adaptation of those of Ref. [16] in the two-party setting to the temporarily trusted
setting we study here. There, informally, the bit commitment scheme consist of commit and open primitives
between two parties, Alice and Bob. First, Alice and Bob execute the commit primitive, where Alice has
input x ∈ {0, 1}` and Bob has no input. As output, Bob receives a notification that Alice has chosen an input
x ∈ {0, 1}`. Afterwards, they may execute the open protocol, during which Bob either accepts or rejects. If
both parties are honest, Bob always accepts and receives the value x. If Alice is dishonest, however, we still
demand that Bob either outputs the correct value of x or rejects (binding). If Bob is dishonest, he should not
be able to gain any information about x before the open protocol is executed (hiding).
Here, for our erasable bit commitment scheme, Alice and Bob use help from temporarily trusted nodes
T1, . . . , Tm in order to implement the commit and open primitives. We assume that, except for at most
t of these nodes which might collaborate adversarially, perhaps with a dishonest Alice or Bob, all these
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temporarily trusted nodes act (quantum) honest-but-curiously during the protocol, without collaborating
with any other nodes during the execution of the protocol. After the execution of the protocol, the trust
assumption is lifted: all the temporarily trusted nodes T1, . . . , Tm and the dishonest party might gather
the data they accumulated during the protocol and act adversarially against the honest parties. In order to
complete the execution of the protocol (and lift the corresponding trust assumption) after a commit phase
which will not be opened, we add a phase to complement the open phase, which we call an erase phase.
This phase forces the temporarily trusted nodes to forget about the commitment before we end the protocol
and lift the trust assumption.
As is standard to simplify security definitions and protocols achieving such security, and as is done in
Ref. [16], we make use of a randomized version of a commitment. Instead of inputting her own string x,
Alice now receives a random string c at the end of the commit phase.
C.2 Formal definitions for erasable bit commitment
To give a more formal definition, we also provide direct adaptation of the definitions of Ref. [16] to the
current setting with temporarily trusted nodes. Note that we may write the commit, open and erase protocols
as CPTPMs CABT , OABT and EABT , respectively, consisting of the local actions of honest Alice, Bob and
the temporarily trusted nodes on registers T = T1 . . . Tm, together with any operations they may perform
on messages that are exchanged.
When all parties are honest, the output of the commit protocol will be a state CABT (ρin) = ρCABT
for some fixed input state ρin, where C ∈ {0, 1}` is the classical output of Alice, and A, B and T are the
internal states of Alice, Bob and the temporarily trusted nodes, respectively. If Alice and some nodes TE ,
for E ⊆ [m] and |E| ≤ t, are dishonest and collaborate, then they might not follow the protocol, and we
use CA′BT ′ETE¯ to denote the resulting map, where E¯ := [m] \ E. Note that CA′BT ′ETE¯ might not have
output C, hence we simply write ρA′BT ′ETE¯ for the resulting output state, where A
′T ′E denote the registers
of the dishonest Alice and TE . Similarly, we use CAB′T ′ETE¯ to denote the CPTPM corresponding to the case
where Bob and TE are dishonest, and write ρCAB′T ′ETE¯ for the resulting output state, whereB′T ′E denote the
registers of the dishonest Bob and TE . The case of both Alice and Bob honest but dishonest TE is similar.
The open protocol can be described similarly. If all parties are honest, the map OABT creates the state
ηCC˜F := (IC ⊗ OABT )(ρCABT ), where C˜ ∈ {0, 1}` and F ∈ {success, failure} is the classical output
of Bob. Again, if Alice and TE are dishonest, we use OA′BT ′ETE¯ to denote the resulting map with output
ηA′T ′ETE¯C˜F
. Similarly, we use OCAB′T ′E to denote the CPTPM corresponding to the case where Bob and
TE are dishonest, and write ηCB′T ′E for the resulting output state. In the case of both Alice and Bob honest
but dishonest TE , we use OCABT ′ETE¯ to denote the CPTPM corresponding to the case TE are dishonest,
and write ηCC˜FT ′ETE¯ for the resulting output state also considering the memory content of the quantum
honest-but-curious nodes in TE¯ .
The erase protocol can also be described similarly. If all parties are honest, the map EABT creates the
state ζCF := (IC ⊗ EABT )(ρCABT ), where F = erase is the classical output of Bob. Again, if Alice and
TE are dishonest, we use EA′BT ′ETE¯ to denote the resulting map with output ζA′T ′EF . Similarly, we use
ECAB′T ′ETE¯ to denote the CPTPM corresponding to the case where Bob and TE are dishonest, and write
ζCB′T ′ETE¯ for the resulting output state also considering the memory content of the quantum honest-but-
curious nodes in TE¯ . The case of both Alice and Bob honest but dishonest TE is similar. Finally, we use τX
to denote the state, which is uniformly random over the set X , i.e., τX :=
∑
x∈X |X|−1 |x〉 〈x|.
The security definitions for EBC as defined here are direct adaptations of the definitions in Ref. [16],
which are themselves a generalization of the ones in Ref. [14], to our setting.
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Definition 2 An (`, ε) randomized erasable string commitment scheme is a protocol between Alice, Bob
and temporarily trusted nodes T1, . . . , Tm satisfying the following properties:
Correctness:
Open: If both Alice and Bob are honest, the set of dishonest Ti, E ⊂ [m] is such that |E| ≤ t, and the
rest of the Ti are quantum honest-but-curious then, after the open protocol, the ideal state σCCFT is defined
such that
1. The distribution of C is uniform, Bob accepts the commitment and the Ti’s learn nothing about c:
σCFT = τ{0,1}` ⊗ |success〉 〈success| ⊗ σT .
2. The joint state ηCC˜FT created by the real protocol is ε-close to the ideal state
ηCC˜FT ≈ε σCCFT .
Erase: If both Alice and Bob are honest, |E| ≤ t and the rest of the Ti are quantum honest-but-curious,
then after the erase protocol, the ideal state σCC˜FT is defined such that
1. The distribution of C is uniform, that of C˜ is constant, Bob outputs an erasure flag and the Ti’s learn
nothing about c:
σCC˜FT = τ{0,1}` ⊗ |0〉 〈0| ⊗ |erase〉 〈erase| ⊗ σT
2. The joint state ζCC˜FT created by the real protocol is ε-close to the ideal state
ζCC˜FT ≈ε σCCFT .
Security for Alice (ε-hiding):
Commit: If Alice is honest, |E| ≤ t and TE¯ are quantum honest-but-curious, then for any joint state
ρCB′T ′ETE¯ created by the commit protocol, Bob and the adversarial nodes do not learn C:
ρCB′T ′E ≈ε τ{0,1}` ⊗ ρB′T ′E
Erase: If Alice is honest, |E| ≤ t and TE¯ are quantum honest-but-curious, then for any joint state
ζCB′T ′ETE¯ created by the erase protocol, the adversaries together with the honest-but-curious nodes do not
learn C:
ζCB′T ′ETE¯ ≈ε τ{0,1}` ⊗ ζB′T ′ETE¯ .
Security for Bob (ε-binding):
If Bob is honest, |E| ≤ t and TE¯ are quantum honest-but-curious then there exists an ideal state
σC˜A′BT ′ETE¯
where C˜ is a classical register such that for all open maps OA′BT ′ETE¯→A′CˆFT ′ETE¯
1. Bob almost never accepts Cˆ 6= C˜:
For σO
C˜A′CˆFT ′ETE¯
= (IC˜ ⊗O)(σC˜A′BT ′ETE¯ ),we have
Pr[Cˆ 6= C˜ and F = success ] ≤ ε.
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2. If the open map is applied to the real committed state, the joint state produced ηA′CˆFT ′ETE¯
:=
O(ρA′BT ′ETE¯ ) is ε-close to the ideal state
ηA′CˆFT ′ETE¯
≈ε σOA′CˆFT ′ETE¯ .
C.3 Security proofs
C.3.1 Intermediate results
We will prove some Lemmas, which will act as intermediaries to prove security. In particular, we will
analyze the actions of the honest-but-curious nodes in the protocol.
Lemma 1 (Corollary to Uhlmann’s Theorem) Suppose that ρ, ρ′ ∈ D(X ) such that 1/2‖ρ − ρ′‖1 < ε.
Then, there exist purifications of ρ and ρ′, |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 in X ⊗ X respectively such that
|ψ〉 〈ψ| ≈√2ε |ψ′〉 〈ψ′| (C.1)
Proof. Using the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequality we have that
F (ρ, ρ′) ≥ 1− 1
2
‖ρ− ρ′‖1 > 1− ε.
Further using Uhlmann’s theorem we have that there exist purifications |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 in X ⊗ X of ρ and ρ′
such that
F (ρ, ρ′) = | 〈ψ|ψ′〉 |,
which implies that
| 〈ψ|ψ′〉 | > 1− ε.
Now using the fact ( [36, Eq. 1.186]) that
1
2
‖ |ψ〉 〈ψ| − |ψ′〉 〈ψ′| ‖1 =
√
1− | 〈ψ|ψ′〉 |2
we have
1
2
‖ |ψ〉 〈ψ| − |ψ′〉 〈ψ′| ‖1 <
√
2ε.
In the following Lemma, we consider the action of an honest-but-curious node in the erasable bit com-
mitment protocol in a general fashion. We suppose that Alice sends the T part of the state ρRT to the party
T . The R part of the state may be arbitrarily distributed between the rest of parties. For example, in the real
protocol the register R = (A, T¯ ), where T¯ represents all the trusted nodes other than the node T . Then, we
consider the cases of ’Open’ and ’Erase’ and show that the state held by T after these are almost decoupled
from the state that Alice gave him. In particular, we assume that after the announcement of ’Open’ (or
’Erase’), T applies the map ΦOT→BT ′ (or Φ
E
T→AT ′) to his part of ρRT and sends the B (or A) share of the
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state to Bob (or Alice). Similarly, the rest of the parties apply an arbitrary channel, ΦR to the register R.
This channel can be arbitrary since the behaviour of T should appear honest irrespective of the strategies of
the other parties by definition. We then show that
(ΦR ⊗ ΦOT→BT ′)(ρRT ) ≈O(√δ) (ΦR ⊗ IT→B)(ρRT )⊗ σ˜T ′
(ΦR ⊗ ΦET→AT ′)(ρRT ) ≈O(√δ) (ΦR ⊗ IT→A)(ρRT )⊗ ω˜T ′
where σ˜T ′ and ω˜T ′ are fixed states.
Lemma 2 Let T be a δ−honest-but-curious node in the erasable bit commitment protocol. Suppose that
during the commit stage of the protocol, Alice sends the T substate of the state ρRT to the party T . The R
part of the state is distributed arbitrarily between the parties other than T . Further, suppose that in the case
of an ’Open’, T applies the channel ΦOT→BT ′ to his state T . Then, there exists a state σ˜T ′ such that for every
state ρRT distributed by Alice during the commit stage and every channel ΦR applied on R during the open
phase, the state ηRBT ′ := (ΦR ⊗ΦOT→BT ′)(ρRT ) (where the B part is given to Bob by T and the T ′ part is
held by T ) produced during the open phase is such that
ηRBT ′ ≈5√2δ (ΦR ⊗ IT→B)(ρRT )⊗ σ˜T ′ .
Similarly, suppose that in the case of an ’Erase’, T applies the channel ΦET→AT ′ to his state T . Then,
there exists a state ω˜T ′ such that for every state ρRT distributed by Alice during the commit stage and every
channel ΦR applied on R during the erase phase, the state ζRAT ′ := (ΦR ⊗ ΦET→AT ′)(ρRT ) (where the A
part is given back to Alice by T and the T ′ part is held by T ) produced during the erase phase is such that
ζRAT ′ ≈5√2δ (ΦR ⊗ IT→A)(ρRT )⊗ ω˜T ′ .
Proof. The proof of this Lemma follows the same argument as the proof of the Rushing Lemma in (Lemma
6.2 in [2]). We will prove this Lemma only for the case of an ’Open’. The case of an ’Erase’ follows
similarly. Note that due to convexity of the trace norm, it suffices to prove this Lemma for pure states.
Further, it is also sufficient to consider isometric channels ΦR for an arbitrary register R, since one can use
the Stinespring representation to write a general channel as an isometric channel composed with the partial
trace (see for example [36, Sec. 2.2.2]) and the trace distance decreases under a partial trace operation.
Suppose that after the announcement of ’Open’, the trusted node T applies the map ΦOT→BT ′ and the
isometric channel ΦR is applied to the register R by the other parties. Choose and fix a state ρ
(1)
RT :=
|ψ(1)RT 〉 〈ψ(1)RT |. We then define the state
η
(1)
RBT ′ = (ΦR ⊗ ΦOT→BT ′)(ρ(1)RT ).
Since T is δ-honest-but-curious in the case of an open, there exists a channel TT ′ such that
(IRB ⊗ TT ′)(η(1)RBT ′) ≈δ (ΦR ⊗ IT→B)(ρ(1)RT )
⇒ η(1)RB ≈δ (ΦR ⊗ IT→B)(ρ(1)RT ).
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Now, we use Lemma 1 and the fact that (ΦR ⊗ IT→B)(ρ(1)RT ) is a pure state to show that there exists a state
σ′T ′′ and a purification η
(1)
RBT ′′ of η
(1)
RB such that
η
(1)
RBT ′′ ≈√2δ (ΦR ⊗ IT→B)(ρ
(1)
RT )⊗ σ′T ′′ .
Further, since η(1)RBT ′′ is a purification of η
(1)
RB and has the same partial state as η
(1)
RBT ′ on registers R and B,
there exists a quantum channel ΩT ′′→T ′ acting only on T ′′ transforming η
(1)
RBT ′′ into η
(1)
RBT ′ ( [36, Proposition
2.29]). Thus, we have
η
(1)
RBT ′ ≈√2δ (ΦR ⊗ IT→B)(ρ
(1)
RT )⊗ σ˜T ′ (C.2)
where σ˜T ′ = ΩT ′′→T ′(σ′T ′′).
We claim that this state σ˜T ′ is the required state. Consider the state ρ = |ψRT 〉 〈ψRT |. Now, let
|ψ′R′RT 〉 := 1/
√
2(|1R′〉 |ψRT 〉 + |2R′〉 |ψ(1)RT 〉) where |1R′〉 and |2R′〉 are orthonormal states. Define the
states
ηRBT ′ := (ΦR ⊗ ΦOT→BT ′)(|ψRT 〉 〈ψRT |))
η′R′RBT ′ := (IR′ ⊗ ΦR ⊗ ΦOT→BT ′)(|ψ′R′RT 〉 〈ψ′R′RT |)).
Since, the node is δ-honest-but-curious irrespective of the strategy of the other parties, we once again have
η′R′RB ≈δ (ΦR ⊗ IT→B)(|ψ′R′RT 〉 〈ψ′R′RT |))
where we have omitted the identity map on R′ for brevity. Arguing as before, we see that there exists a state
σ′′T ′ such that
η′R′RBT ′ ≈√2δ (ΦR ⊗ IT→B)(|ψ′R′RT 〉 〈ψ′R′RT |)⊗ σ′′T ′ .
If we now apply the channel of the measurement in the {|1R′〉 〈1R′ | , |2R′〉 〈2R′ |} to both the sides of the
above equation we get
ηRBT ′ ≈2√2δ (ΦR ⊗ I(T→B))(|ψRT 〉 〈ψRT |))⊗ σ′′T ′ (C.3)
η
(1)
RBT ′ ≈2√2δ (ΦR ⊗ I(T→B))(|ψ
(1)
RT 〉 〈ψ(1)RT |))⊗ σ′′T ′ (C.4)
Combining Eq. C.2 and Eq. C.4, we get
σ′′T ′ ≈3√2δ σ˜T ′ .
Using this we can show that
ηRBT ′ ≈5√2δ (ΦR ⊗ I(T→B))(|ψRT 〉 〈ψRT |))⊗ σ˜T ′
which proves our claim since |ψRT 〉 was arbitrary.
In the next Lemma, we consider the action of all the honest temporarily trusted nodes together during
the protocol. This Lemma will be useful while proving the various security definitions. Let E be the set of
adversarial trusted nodes (Ti). We assume that at least one of Alice and Bob is honest. This assumption is
satisfied by the hypotheses of our security requirements. Under this assumption, during the commit stage
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Alice distributes the state ρA′BCTE¯TE , where the register BC = (Θ, Z,R) and is held by Bob. Apart from
this restriction, we do not place any other restrictions on the behaviour of these parties. Alice, Bob and
the adversarial trusted nodes TE follow an arbitrary (possibly dishonest) strategy during the protocol and
the trusted nodes TE¯ act honest-but-curiously. Under these conditions, we show that the trusted nodes act
almost honestly upto storing some fixed state in their memories.
Lemma 3 Consider the erasable bit commitment protocol. Let E be the set of adversarial trusted nodes
(Ti). We assume that one of the parties Alice or Bob is honest. Suppose that during the commit stage,
(possibly dishonest) Alice prepares and distributes the state ρA′BCTE¯TE , where the registerBC = (Θ, Z,R)
and is held by Bob. Let ΦOABCTE be the channel applied by Alice, Bob and the adversarial nodes in case of
an ’Open’. Similarly, let ΦEABCTE be the channel applied by Alice, Bob and the adversarial nodes in case
of an ’Erase’. Then, in case of an ’Open’, the state received by Bob ηAT ′¯
E
T ′EBCB (where T
′¯
E
and T ′E are
registers held by TE¯ and TE after an ’Open’) satisfies
ηA′T ′¯
E
T ′EBCB ≈m√2δ (ITE¯→BE¯ ⊗ Φ
O
ABCTE
)(ρA′BCTE¯TE )⊗ σ˜TE¯ .
for some fixed state σ˜TE¯ . In the case of an ’Erase’, the state ζA′T ′¯ET ′EBC received back by Alice satisfies
(where T ′¯
E
and T ′E are registers held by TE¯ and TE after an ’Erase’)
ζA′T ′¯
E
T ′EBC ≈m√2δ (ITE¯→AE¯ ⊗ Φ
E
ABCTE
)(ρA′BCTE¯TE )⊗ ω˜TE¯ .
for some fixed state ω˜TE¯ .
Proof. Once again, we will prove the statement for the case of an ’Open’. The proof for an ’Erase’ follows
similarly. Suppose, that in case of an ’Open’, each honest-but-curious node Ti for i ∈ E¯ applies the channel
ΦTi := Φ
O
Ti→BiT ′i and the other parties apply the channel Φ
O
ABCTE
collectively to their states. Thus,
ηA′T ′¯
E
T ′EBCB =
⊗
i∈E¯
ΦTi
⊗ ΦOABCTE
 (ρA′BCTE¯TE )
Now using Lemma 2, we know that there exist fixed states σ˜Ti for i ∈ E¯ for which
ηA′T ′¯
E
T ′EΘB ≈5√2δ
ITE¯1→BE¯1 ⊗
 ⊗
i∈E¯;i 6=E¯1
ΦTi
⊗ ΦOABCTE
 (ρA′BCTE¯TE )⊗ σ˜TE¯1
≈5|E¯|√2δ
(
ITE¯→BE¯ ⊗ ΦOABCTE
)
(ρA′BCTE¯TE )⊗
⊗
i∈E¯
σ˜T ′i
≈5m√2δ
(
ITE¯→BE¯ ⊗ ΦOABCTE
)
(ρA′BCTE¯TE )⊗
⊗
i∈E¯
σ˜T ′i
where the second step is the result of repeating the first step multiple times, and in the third step we use the
fact that |E¯| ≤ m. Hence, the Lemma is true for σ˜TE¯ := ⊗i∈E¯ σ˜T ′i
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C.3.2 Correctness for honest Alice and Bob
Correctness for Open:
Proof. If Alice is honest, then she generates the state
ρXΘZT :=
∑
x,θ,z
2−(2n+k) |x〉 〈x| ⊗ |θ〉 〈θ| ⊗ |z〉 〈z| ⊗Hθ |Enc(x)⊕ z〉 〈Enc(x)⊕ z|Hθ
and sends θ, z to Bob, and the registers T = (Ti) to the trusted nodes. Let E be the set of adversaries.
Suppose, that in case of an open each honest-but-curious node Ti for i ∈ E¯ applies the channel ΦTi :=
ΦTi→BiT ′i and the adversarial nodes apply the channel ΦTE := ΦTE→BET ′E collectively to their states. Let
ηXΘBT ′¯
E
T ′E be the real state of the protocol after the trusted nodes forwards their shares to Bob, that is
ηXΘZBT ′¯
E
T ′E =
⊗
i∈E¯
ΦTi
⊗ ΦTE
 (ρXΘZT )
Further, we suppose that Alice and Bob shared a random r ∈ R for privacy amplification during the commit
phase. By Lemma 3 we know that
ηXΘZBT ′¯
E
T ′E ≈5m√2δ
(
ITE¯→BE¯ ⊗ ΦTE
)
(ρXΘZT )⊗ σ˜T ′¯
E
. (C.5)
for some fixed state σ˜T ′¯
E
. For this strategy of the trusted nodes we define the ideal state σCCFT to simply be
the state
σCCFT :=
∑
c
2−l |cc〉 〈cc| ⊗ |success〉 〈success| ⊗ σT
for σT defined as
σT := σ˜T ′¯
E
⊗ ηT ′E
where ηT ′E is the partial state held by the nodes TE at the end of the ’Open’ stage in the real protocol. This
ideal state satisfies the security requirements given in 2. Further, if we apply the decoding map to both sides
of Eq. C.5, we see that Bob is able to recover Xˆ = X with high probability since |E| ≤ t and the channel
error rate is γ. Now observe that
H5m
√
2δ
min (X|T ′¯ET ′E)η ≥ (δc + δ′)n
by using Eq. C.5 and an argument similar to the one given in Sec. 5.5. By privacy amplification (` = δcn),
we can show that the distance between the ideal state and the real state is at most
ε′ = 2−
δ′n
2
−1 + 5m
√
2δ.
Correctness for Erase: Following the same arguments as above one can prove the correctness of Erase
in our protocol.
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C.3.3 Security for honest Alice
The hiding properties of the protocol during the commit stage were proven in Section 5.3.
Further, the proof of security for Alice after an erase follows the argument as the proof for correctness of
an Erase. The only difference being that the adversaries in this case have access to Θ as well. The arguments
given in Section 5.4 handle this too.
C.3.4 Security for honest Bob
Proof. We now formally prove security for honest Bob. We use a simulator argument similar to that used in
Ref. [16] (proof of Theorem III.5) to define the ideal state σC˜A′BT ′ETE¯ . We show that Alice is committed to
C˜ after the commit phase, i.e. she cannot open something different than C˜ except with negligible probability.
Suppose that during the commit phase of the real protocol, Alice sends the T part of the state ρA′T to
the trusted nodes and θ and r to Bob. Also, let ΦTi be the channel applied by the honest-but-curious node
i ∈ E¯. First, for the honest-but-curious party i ∈ E¯, we let the state σ˜Ti be the state shown to exist in
Lemma 2, such that for every initial state ρATi¯Ti and every channel ΦATi¯ applied to the registers held by all
the other parties
(ΦATi¯ ⊗ ΦTi)(ρATi¯Ti) ≈5√2δ (ΦATi¯ ⊗ ITi→Bi)(ρATi¯Ti)⊗ σ˜T ′i .
Now, we show the existence of the ideal state σC˜A′BT ′ETE¯ algorithmically by making Alice and the Ti’s
interact with a simulator. Imagine a protocol Πsim where instead of sending the quantum states to the trusted
parties during the commit stage, Alice sends the shares of the honest-but-curious parties ρTE¯ to a simulator
and the share of the adversaries to the adversaries. Alice also shares θ and r with the simulator. The sim-
ulator measures ρTE¯ in the θ basis to get y¯E¯ . Define y¯ := (y¯E¯ 0E) and let y˜ be the codeword closest to y¯.
Further, let x˜ := Dec(y˜) and c˜ := Ext(x˜, r). Then, it re-encodes y¯E¯ in the θ basis (as H
θ |y¯E¯〉) and sends
it to the honest-but-curious parties E¯. Further, in this protocol, we assume that in the case of an ’Open’, the
honest-but-curious nodes i ∈ E¯, Ti apply the channel Φ(id)Ti which we define as Φ
(id)
Ti
(ρ) = ρ⊗ σ˜Ti for every
state ρ. Finally, Alice and the adversaries TE apply whatever channel they apply during the commit stage in
the real protocol. To prepare the ideal state σC˜A′BT ′ETE¯ , the parties follow the above protocol. The register
C˜ simply contains the string c˜.
We now prove that for any strategy of Alice and the adversaries after the commit stage on the ideal
state defined above, Bob opens the string c˜ during a successful open. Suppose, Bob measures the state, he
receives during the open stage, in the θ basis and gets the outcome yˆ. Since, the TE¯ do not change or disturb
their states during Πsim, the Hamming distance (h) between yˆ and y¯ satisfies
h(yˆ, y¯) ≤ |E| n
m
+ γn
≤
(
t
m
+ γ
)
n =
d− 1
4
.
with high probability. Further, we have that h(yˆ, y˜) ≤ h(yˆ, y¯) + h(y¯, y˜) ≤ 3(d − 1)/4. For any codeword
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y′ such that y′ 6= y˜, we have that
h(yˆ, y′) ≥ h(y˜, y′)− h(y˜, yˆ)
≥ d− 3(d− 1)
4
>
d− 1
4
.
Since, Bob discards the commitment in case the Hamming distance between the measured string and the
nearest codeword is more than (d − 1)/4, the adveraries cannot change the commitment after the commit
stage. Hence, the ideal state defined above satisfies the security definition.
Now, we will prove that the real state produced during the protocol is close to the ideal one after the
open map is applied. Since, the action of the trusted nodes and the simulator in Πsim commutes, this protocol
would produce the same state as a protocol where the simulator is between the trusted nodes and Bob. Then,
observe that in Πsim, since the simulator encodes the string y¯E¯ in the θ basis and Bob measures this in the
θ basis, we can simply remove this re-encoding and measurement step from the modified protocol. The
protocol constructed this way, though, is exactly the original protocol, except for the fact that the honest-
but-curious nodes instead of applying the maps ΦTi , apply Φ
(id)
Ti
. Using Lemma 3, we can prove that the
state of this protocol is 5m
√
2δ close to the real state.
D Comparison to other definitions for binding
The binding condition used in the noisy storage model [16] requires the existence of a classical register C˜
extending the real state of the protocol ρABT to ρC˜ABT such that the probability of successfully opening a
commitment Cˆ 6= C˜ on ρC˜ABT is negligible. It has been argued in Ref. [31], that satisfying such a condition
is not possible unless there is a register, unaccessible to the parties, which would prevent the purification of
the protocol. As shown in Section 7, this is not the case for bit commitment protocols in the temporarily
trusted party setting. Hence, similar to the relativistic setting, we cannot expect bit commitment protocols
in the temporarily trusted party setting to satisfy this stronger bit commitment condition.
Several other papers [6, 29, 31, 37] use a different weak-binding condition. For the statement of this
condition, let us define pc to be the maximum probability of dishonest Alice being able to successfully open
the commitment c. A bit commitment protocol is said to be ∆−weak-binding according to the definition
used in the aforementioned papers if ∑
c∈{0,1}`
pc ≤ 1 + ∆. (D.1)
If a general protocol is binding according to our definition, then one can show that it is also O(2`ε)-weak
binding, where ε is the security parameter in Definition 2. To see this note that for every state ρA′BTETE¯ at
the end of the commit phase, there exists an ideal state σC˜A′BTETE¯ =
∑
c PC˜(c) |c〉 〈c| ⊗ σ(c)A′BTETE¯ , with a
classical distribution PC˜ over {0, 1}`. Alice can only open Cˆ 6= C˜ with probability at most ε on this ideal
state. To bound pc for every commitment c, one can choose the optimal open map allowing Alice to open
the commitment c with the maximum probability. By the security definition, this map would allow Alice to
open c with probability at most PC˜(c) + ε. Hence, the left hand side can be at most 2
`ε more than 1 for the
ideal state. One can similarly argue that the left hand side can be at most O(2`ε) more than 1 for the real
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state.
We can, however, show that our protocol satisfies the weak binding condition mentioned above without
the exponential dependence on `. This follows from the fact that in our protocol (m− t) of the third parties
are honest-but-curious and hence they do not interact with Alice, unless required by the protocol. As a result,
the quantum channel applied by these parties (or the strategy adopted by them) is independent of c, which is
chosen by Alice after the commit phase. The distribution over the commitment is determined completely by
the shares held by the honest-but-curious parties and hence remains constant irrespective of the map applied
by Alice and the corrupt third parties. Thus, for our protocol, the sum in Eq. D.1 can be bounded by one.
The ∆−weak-binding condition presented above is known to be not composable (see e.g., [14,31] ). The
binding condition used in the noisy storage model, on the other hand, is motivated through considerations
for composability. As mentioned earlier, we adopted the binding condition in the noisy storage model for
the temporarily trusted setting, so that composability results in the former may be lifted to this setting.
E Decoupling of honest-but-curious nodes during the protocol
In addition to satisfying the hiding property for Bob’s and the adversarial nodes, our protocol satisfies the
following hiding condition for the honest-but-curious nodes.
Definition 3 (Hiding for the honest-but-curious nodes) If Alice is honest, |E| ≤ t and TE¯ are quantum
honest-but-curious, then for any joint state ρCB′T ′ETE¯ created by the commit protocol, the honest-but-curious
nodes do not learn C, or equivalently, they are completely decoupled from C:
∀i ∈ E¯ : ρCTi ≈ε τ{0,1}l ⊗ ρTi
The proof that our protocol satisfies this property was given in Sec. 6.1.
F Definitions and proofs for the expungement property
F.1 Definition of the expungement property
Definition 4 An (`, ε) randomized erasable string commitment scheme is said to satisfy the expungement
on success property if it satisfies the following properties:
Open: If both Alice and Bob are honest and FA = FB = success after the open protocol, then there
exists an ideal state σCCFT satisfying the following
1. The distribution of C is uniform and the Ti’s learn nothing about c:
σCFT = τ{0,1}` ⊗ |success〉 〈success| ⊗ σT .
2. The joint state ηCC˜FT created by the real protocol is ε-close to the ideal state
ηCC˜FT ≈ε σCCFT .
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Erase: If Alice is honest, Bob does not collaborate with the trusted nodes during the protocol and
FA = erase after the erase protocol, then the joint state ζCB′T created by the erase protocol satisfies the
following:
ζCB′T ≈ε τ{0,1}` ⊗ ζB′T .
F.2 Proof of the expungement property
We only prove min-entropy bounds on the relevant states. These are sufficient to prove the required state-
ments, by taking the commitment output length ` appropriately according to the privacy amplification theo-
rem. However, depending on the noise parameters it might be necessary to change the some of the protocol
parameters to achieve security as above. In order to complete the proof that our robust protocol satisfies
the expungement property, we first list the properties of min-entropy that we will use, and then derive the
desired min-entropy bound. We denote by E the register of the adversarial trusted node who keeps infor-
mation about X , by ρTXY ZUθ the state prepared by Alice and by ζEXY ZUθ = NT→E(ψTXY ZUθ) the state
after the adversary acted on T and kept register E, after sending back to Alice what should have been the
content of T for erasure. We focus on proving the desired bound on H7εmin(X|EZ) for ζ in the case of an
erase (here ε is a small parameter chosen according to Ref. [25] to achieve the bound given in Eq. F.9). A
similar bound on H7εmin(X|E) for η in the case of an open is proved similarly.
F.2.1 Preliminaries for min-entropy bound
We have x ∈R {0, 1}k, z ∈R {0, 1}n, θ ∈R {0, 1}n .
Also, y = Enc(x), u = y ⊕ z, y = u⊕ z and |ψ〉T = Hθ |u〉T .
Hence, the partial states conditioned on u, ρuTZ = ρ
u
T⊗ζuZ and then ζuEZ = NT→E(ρuTZ) = NT→E(ρuT )⊗
ζuZ = ζ
u
E ⊗ ζuZ , and then
Hmin(Z|UE) = Hmin(Z|U). (F.1)
Then,
Hmin(Z|U) = Hmax(Z|U) = Hmin(U |Z) = k, (F.2)
since Hmin(Z|U) = Hmin(Y |U) = Hmin(Y ) = Hmin(X) = k, and similarly for Hmax(Z|U) and
Hmin(U |Z).
For smooth entropies, we also have that
Hεmin(X|EZ) = Hεmin(Y |EZ) = Hεmin(U |EZ), (F.3)
in which the last equality follows from [38, Lemma A.7].
We also make use of the following chain rules for smooth entropies (these are special cases of the
inequalities proven in [26]), with fε = log( 11−√1−ε2 ),
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H2εmin(AB|C) ≥ Hmin(A|BC) + Hεmin(B|C)− fε, (F.4)
Hεmax(AB|C) ≤ Hmax(A|BC) + Hmax(B|C) + fε, (F.5)
H2εmin(AB|C) ≤ H7εmin(A|BC) + H2εmax(B|C) + 2fε, (F.6)
Hεmax(AB|C) ≥ Hmin(A|BC) + H2εmax(B|C)− 2fε. (F.7)
We use the fact that the smooth entropies satisfy a data processing inequality,
Hεmax(Z|E) ≤ Hεmax(Z). (F.8)
Finally, we use the following bound from uncertainty relation/sampling (see [25]), for some parameters
µε and δε, and for γ the tolerable noise rate,
Hεmin(U |E) ≥ n(1−H2(γ + µε))− δε. (F.9)
F.2.2 Deriving the min-entropy bound
We can now prove the desired bound on H7εmin(X|EZ),
k −H7εmin(X|EZ) = Hmin(U |Z)−H7εmin(U |EZ) by (F.2) and (F.3)
≤ Hεmax(UZ)−H2εmax(Z) + 2fε by (F.7)
−H2εmin(UZ|E) + H2εmax(Z|E) + 2fε by (F.6)
≤ Hεmax(UZ)−H2εmin(UZ|E) + 4fε by (F.8)
≤ Hmax(U) + Hmax(Z|U) + fε by (F.5)
−Hεmin(U |E)−Hmin(Z|UE) + fε + 4fε by (F.4)
= n+ Hmax(Z|U) + 6fε
−Hεmin(U |E)−Hmin(Z|U) by (F.1)
= n−Hεmin(U |E) + 6fε by (F.2)
≤ n− n(1−H2(γ + µε)) + δε + 6fε by (F.9)
= n(H2(γ + µε)) + δε + 6fε.
Rearranging terms, we get
H7εmin(X|EZ) ≥ k − n(H2(γ + µε))− δε − 6fε. (F.10)
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